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Financial Services
An analysis of the decision in Kleinwort Benson
by Alastair Hudson
This note should be of interest to 
those considering over-the-counter 
derivatives and those considering theo
impact on the law of restitution and of 
trusts of the recent litany of swaps cases.
PASSING ON DEFENCE
The Court of Appeal in Kleinwort 
Benson v Birmingham City Council [1996] 4 
All ER 733 considered the availability of 
the defence of passing on. The plaintiff 
bank had entered into an interest rate 
swap agreement with the defendant local 
authority. In the wake of the House of 
Lords' decision in Hazell v Hammersmith &_ 
Fulham LBC [1992] 2 AC 1, it transpired 
that the agreement was void, being ultra 
vires the local authority. The agreement 
had provided that the parties owed 
amounts of money to one another 
calculated by reference to a notional 
amount of money. Usually, one payment 
is a floating rate of interest which has
o
been swapped for the other payment, 
which is a fixed rate of interest (in many 
of these swaps cases, a loan was made as 
part of the agreement and it was by 
reference to the amount of that loan that 
payments were calculated).
The bank contended that the defence 
of passing on should be available to it, on 
the basis that it had entered into further 
interest rate swap agreements with third 
parties, to hedge its risk under the 
agreement with the local authority. It was 
this hedge that was said to constitute the 
passing on. The reasoning behind this 
was that the amount owed to the third 
party would be the inverse to that owed 
to or received from the local authority: 
the value of the hedge would be 
calculated to move in an opposite and 
roughly equal way to the value of the 
main contract.
The Court of Appeal held that the 
hedging agreement was not a part of the 
main agreement with the local authority, 
therefore amounts paid under it would 
not attract the defence of passing on. The 
decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Kleinwort Benson is predicated on the 
difficult proposition advanced by
Hobhouse J that, when reciprocal 
payments are made under an interest rate 
swap:
'the later payment is treated as, pro tanto, 
repayment of the earlier sum paid by the other 
party' ([1994] 4 All ER 890 at p. 929 per 
Hobhouse J and affirmed at [1996] 4 All 
ER 733 at p. 738 per Evans EJ).
REPAYMENT ANALYSIS
There are two practical issues to 
confront here and one theoretical one. 
The first practical problem is that there 
are not usually two payments made: 
payment netting applies so that only one 
amount of money is transferred on a net 
basis. There is therefore a difficulty in 
saying that a single payment is a 
repayment of an amount which was never 
paid.
The second practical problem is 
whether the reference to a repayment 
made by Hobhouse J means a payment 
which has already been made. There is 
insufficient evidence available in the 
judgments to know whether or not) o
payments were made reciprocally, and 
not on a net basis, such that the 
repayment hypothesis could have some 
grounding in fact. It seems unlikely that 
this was the case   it would be very 
exceptional for payment netting not to be 
used in the mature derivatives markets. 
Even when dealing with illiquid assets, 
most derivatives contracts contain some 
formula by which a net amount can be 
calculated. The appointment of a 
calculation agent between the parties is 
done with exactly this in mind.
The theoretical question is then: how 
should an interest rate swap be analysed? 
At one level there is a single contract
o
under which the parties agree to make 
reciprocal payments which are reduced 
to a single net amount and that net 
amount is paid across (the single 
executory contract analysis). However, 
many models for calculating the 
appropriate pricing structure of an 
interest rate swap will see that swap as a 
series of mutual debts to be made 
between the parties, all binding from the
time of the creation of the agreement but 
to be considered as separately 
enforceable. Thus there is no single 
executory contract, but rather a series of 
executory contracts which may or may 
not be performed. In either event, the 
contract does not consider payments to 
be repayments of one another. Payments 
are amounts payable one way calculated 
after set-off of simultaneous, reciprocal 
obligations.
Alternatively the interest rate swap 
agreement can be read as being made up 
of a series of individual contracts all 
subject to a condition precedent. It is 
possible that the floating and fixed 
amounts would cancel out with the result 
that there was no amount to be paid   
that is, the obligation would lead to no 
payment being made. Due to the 
payment netting provision, the condition 
precedent analysis would say that there is 
only a 50:50 chance that one of the 
parties will have to make a payment in 
any event. Rather than payments being 
reciprocal, at least one party will not be 
required to make any payment on each 
reset date.
Therefore, the analysis based on 
repayment does not appear to operate on 
any basis of practical or theoretical fact. 
As a result, its utility as a fiction appears 
to be similarly limited. It does not reflect 
any of the risk management or pricing- 
motivated analyses that form the parties' 
contractual common intention.
ANALYSING THE SWAP
Many models for calculating the 
appropriate pricing structure of an 
interest rate swap will see that swap as a 
series of mutual debts to be made 
between the parties.
NO SINGLE CONTRACT
We know little about the hedge in 
Kleinwort Benson. However, what can be 
discussed is standard market practice. A 
financial institution will not hedge eachO
transaction on a separate basis. This is 
unlikely even if the trade is particularly 27
large or particularly intricate. Rather, 
hedging strategies on the institution's 
proprietary liability (that is, in legal 
terms, its own personal liabilities) are 
organised on the basis of the entire swap 
book. The institution considers the broad 
range of its exposure, sometimes by 
currency or by type of business, and then
sets in place hedging arrangements tor o o o
contain that exposure within acceptable 
limits. Thus hedging is fluid and generally 
not contract-specific.
For the Court of Appeal to seek a 
nexus between the agreement with the 
local authority and the hedgingJ o o
agreement with a third party would 
necessarily be a difficult task. Tracing any 
asset through such a mixture would be 
similarly complicated.
However, the proper analysis of an 
interest rate swap, based on the analysis 
set out above, might show that it is 
possibly not a single executory contract
in any event. The courts are assuming 
that there is one single contract (becauseo x
the point is not being taken before them) 
and therefore looking for a hedge that 
operates in the same manner. When the 
interest rate swap is seen to be what it is, 
an amalgam of debts which may or may 
not crystallise, the nexus between the 
hedge to the original interest rate swap 
agreement perhaps seems less opaque.
The better approach might be to 
assess whether the risk assumed by the 
bank is one which the bank sought to 
address through hedging arrangements 
which were not a requirement of the 
agreement any more than it was a 
requirement of the agreement for the 
local authority to procure further risk 
management protection. The defence 
should only be available in those terms 
where the risk of passing on is within the 
common intention of the parties. In 
Kleinwort Benson the plaintiff's hedging 
strategy was the result of a unilateral
ARTIFICIAL RESTRICTION
The reasoning behind the Court of 
Appeal's decision appears to open as 
many issues as it resolves. By restricting 
itself to the classical discussion of 
passing on, the Court of Appeal is failing 
to appreciate the context of modern 
portfolio theory.
decision. The outcome of the Court of 
Appeal's decision appears to achieve a 
just result in those terms, but the 
reasoning behind it appears to open as 
many issues as it resolves. By restricting 
itself to the classical discussion of passing 
on, the Court of Appeal is failing to 
appreciate the context of modern 
portfolio theory. @
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Land Law
The fight against gazumping
by Professor M P Thompson
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The new government, as part of its 
general reforming zeal, has decided to 
review the conveyancing procedures in 
England and Wales and, in particular, to 
seek to stamp out the practice of 
gazumping which, apparently, after the 
recent and prolonged slump in the 
property market, has returned to cast its 
shadow over the conveyancing scene. The 
practice is well known and almost 
universally frowned upon. In short, the 
vendor agrees, subject to contract, to sell
PURCHASER'S COMPENSATION
Changing the law to allow the purchaser 
compensation would certainly be seen by 
some as an improvement. A difficulty in 
the way of such a proposal is, however, 
its somewhat one-sided nature which 
may result in hardship to the vendor.
a house to the purchaser for, say, £70,000 
and then subsequently refuses to 
exchange contracts unless the purchaser 
raises the price to £75,000   usually 
because a higher offer has been made by 
another party. If the purchaser refuses to 
meet the new asking price, he or she is
out of pocket as a result of incurring 
expenditure on search fees and a survey. 
The purchaser understandably feels 
aggrieved and considers that 
compensation should be available 
although the law at present offers no such 
remedy. The question which arises is 
whether some change in the law could 
usefully be made.
The enthusiasm to revisit the 
problem may be new but the difficulties 
in tackling it have been recognised for 
some considerable time. Probably the 
first occasion that gazumping came to 
public attention was the introduction, in 
1971, by Kevin McNamara MP of the 
Abolition of Gazumping and Kindred 
Practices Bill. As is the usual fate of 
Private Members' bills, this did not reach 
the statute book; but the matter was 
referred to the Law Commission, who 
declined to recommend any legislative 
change. It is interesting to consider some
o o
of the proposals which were considered 
to determine what course of action, if 
any, might now be considered to beJ o
appropriate.
POSSIBLE REMEDIES
One option is to make the practice of 
gazumping a criminal offence. Apart from 
the very real problem of defining such an 
offence, there is a serious objection in 
principle. It is not generally a criminal 
offence to break a contract. This being 
the case, it is difficult to see any 
justification for the criminalisation of a 
refusal to enter a binding contract. The 
criminal law should, it is submitted, have 
no place in the present context.
An alternative to the imposition of 
criminal sanctions is to require the 
vendor to compensate the purchaser for 
expenditure which the latter incurs if the 
vendor seeks to back out of the deal. At 
present, the law will only award such 
compensation in unusual cases of pre- 
contractual expenditure and certainly 
only where the expenditure is that 
normally incurred in a conveyancing 
transaction   see Regalian Properties pic v 
London Docklands Development Corporation 
[1995] 1 All ER 1005. Changing the law 
to allow the purchaser compensation
